Abstract. An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (sr) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that is "as stable as possible", i.e. admits the fewest number of blocking pairs. In this paper we prove that, given an sr instance with n agents, in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of finding a matching with the fewest number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and not approximable within n 1 2 −ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. If the preference lists contain ties, we improve this result to n 1−ε . Also, we show that, given an integer K and an sr instance I in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of deciding whether I admits a matching with exactly K blocking pairs is NP-complete. By contrast, if K is constant, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a matching with at most (or exactly) K blocking pairs, or reports that no such matching exists. Finally, we give upper and lower bounds for the minimum number of blocking pairs over all matchings in terms of some properties of a stable partition, given an sr instance I.
Introduction
The Stable Roommates problem (sr) is a classical combinatorial problem that has been studied extensively in the literature [3, 9, 7, 4, 15, 8] . An instance I of sr contains an undirected graph G = (A, E) where A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } and m = |E|. We assume that G contains no isolated vertices. We interchangeably refer to the vertices of G as the agents, and we refer to G as the underlying graph of I. The vertices adjacent to a given agent a i ∈ A are the acceptable agents for a i , denoted by A i . If a j ∈ A i , we say that a i finds a j acceptable. (Note that the acceptability relation is symmetric, i.e. a j ∈ A i if and only if a i ∈ A j .) Moreover we assume that in I, a i has a linear order ≺ ai over A i , which we refer to as a i 's preference list. If a j ≺ ai a k , we say that a i prefers a j to a k . Given a j ∈ A i , define rank ai (a j ) = 1 + |{a k ∈ A i : a k ≺ ai a j }|.
Let M be a matching in I. If {a i , a j } ∈ M , we say that a i is matched in M and M (a i ) denotes a j , otherwise a i is unmatched in M . A blocking pair with respect to M is an edge {a i , a j } ∈ E\M such that (i) either a i is unmatched in M , or a i is matched in M and prefers a j to M (a i ), and (ii) either a j is unmatched in M , or a j is matched in M and prefers a i to M (a j ). Let bp I (M ) denote the set of blocking pairs with respect to M in I (we omit the subscript if the instance is clear from the context). Matching M is stable in I if bp I (M ) = ∅.
Gale and Shapley [3] showed that an instance of sr need not admit a stable matching (see for example the sr instance I r in Figure 1 where r = 1). Irving [7] gave an O(m) algorithm that finds a stable matching or reports that none exists, given an instance I of sr. The algorithm in [7] assumes that in I, all preference lists are complete (i.e. A i = A\{a i } for each a i ∈ A) and n is even, though it is straightforward to generalise the algorithm to the problem model defined here (i.e. the case of incomplete lists) [4] . Henceforth we denote by src the special case of sr in which all preference lists are complete.
As the problem name suggests, an application of sr arises in the context of campus accommodation allocation, where we seek to assign students to share two-person rooms, based on their preferences over one another. Another application occurs in the context of forming pairings of players for chess tournaments [10] . Very recently, a more serious application of sr has been studied, involving pairwise kidney exchange between incompatible patient-donor pairs [14] . Here, preference lists can be constructed on the basis of compatibility profiles between patients and potential donors.
Empirical results [12] suggest that, as n increases, the probability that a random sr instance with n agents admits a stable matching decreases steeply. Equivalently, as n grows large, these results suggest that an arbitrary matching in a random sr instance with n agents is likely to admit at least one blocking pair. In practical situations, a blocking pair {a i , a j } of a given matching M need not always lead to M being undermined by a i and a j , since these agents might not realise that together they block M . For example, in situations where preference lists are not public knowledge, there may be limited channels of communication that would lead to the awareness of blocking pairs in practice. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assert that the greater the number of blocking pairs of a given matching M , the greater the likelihood that M would be undermined by a pair of agents in practice. Hence, given an sr instance that does not admit a stable matching, one may regard a matching that admits 1 blocking pair as being "more stable" than a matching that admits 10 blocking pairs, for example. This motivates the problem of finding, given an sr instance I with no stable matching, a matching in I that admits the fewest number of blocking pairs [11, 2] . Such a matching is, in the sense described here, "as stable as possible".
Given an sr instance I, define bp(I) = min{|bp I (M )| : M is a matching in I}. Define min-bp-sr to be the problem of finding, given an sr instance I, a matching M in I such that bp(M ) = bp(I). (Note that, if I is an src instance where n is even, clearly M must be a perfect matching in I.) In Section 2, we show that min-bp-sr is NP-hard and very difficult to approximate. In particular we show that min-bp-sr is not approximable within n 1 2 −ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. The result holds even for complete preference lists.
We also consider the variant srt of sr in which preference lists may include ties. Ties arise naturally in practical applications: for example in the kidney exchange context, two donors may be equally compatible for a given patient. We also denote by srtc the special case of srt in which all preference lists are complete. The definition of a blocking pair in the srt and srtc cases is identical to that given for sr (however the term "prefers" in the sr definition is interpreted as "strictly prefers" in the presence of ties). (Note that in [8] , stable matchings in srt and srtc are referred to as weakly stable matchings, where three stability definitions are given; however weak stability is the more commonly-studied notion in the literature.) Clearly an instance of srtc need not admit a stable matching. Moreover it is known [13, 8] that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, given an instance of srtc, is NPcomplete. Let min-bp-srt denote the variant of min-bp-sr in which preference lists may include ties. In Section 2, we show that min-bp-srt is not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. The result holds even if all preference lists are complete, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie has length 2.
We now remark on the format of the inapproximability results that we present for min-bp-sr and min-bp-srt. We implicitly assume that a given instance I of the former problem is unsolvable, so that bp(I) ≥ 1. Recall that the solvability or otherwise of I can be determined in O(m) time [7, 4] . Hence bp(I) can be regarded as the objective function for measuring performance guarantee. On the other hand, given an instance I of min-bp-srt, we do not assume that I is unsolvable, since the problem of deciding whether this is the case is NP-complete [13, 8] . Hence possibly bp(I) = 0, and therefore we use opt(I) to measure performance guarantee, where opt(I) = 1 + bp(I). In fact our inapproximability result for min-bp-srt shows that, given any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases that I admits a stable matching, and bp(I) ≥ n 1−ε . We also consider the case that we require a matching to admit exactly K blocking pairs. Define exact-bp-sr to be the problem of deciding, given an sr instance I and an integer K, whether I admits a matching M such that bp(M ) = K. In Section 2 we show that exact-bp-sr is NP-complete (even for complete preference lists). However by contrast, in Section 3, we prove that exact-bp-sr is solvable in polynomial time if K is a constant. In particular we give an O(m K+1 ) algorithm that takes as input an sr instance I and a constant integer K, and finds a matching M in I such that bp(M ) = K, or reports that no such matching exists. We show how to adapt this algorithm to find a matching M in I such that bp(M ) ≤ K, or report that no such matching exists.
We next give a remark regarding related work. An alternative method has been considered in the literature for coping with instances of sr that do not admit a stable matching. Tan [16] defined a stable partition in a given instance I of sr, which is a generalisation of the concept of a stable matching in I. Following a4i+1 : a4i+2 a4i+3 a4i+4 [12], a stable partition is a permutation Π of A satisfying the following two properties (which implicitly assume that if a i is a fixed point of Π then a i is appended to his own preference list):
Tan [16] showed that every instance I of sr admits a stable partition, and he also gave an O(n 2 ) algorithm for finding such a structure in I. Moreover, starting from a stable partition, Tan [17] showed how to construct, also in O(n 2 ) time, a largest matching M in I with the property that the matched pairs in M are stable within themselves. However such a matching may only be half the size of a maximum (cardinality) matching in I. Yet in many applications we seek to match as many agents as possible, and as discussed above, in order to satisfy this property, in many cases a certain number of blocking pairs may be tolerated. For example, suppose that r ≥ 1 and consider the sr instance I r and example matchings M In Section 4, for a given sr instance I, we give upper and lower bounds for bp(I) in terms of some properties of a stable partition in I.
Inapproximability of min-bp-sr and min-bp-srt
In this section we present reductions showing the NP-hardness and inapproximability of each of min-bp-sr and min-bp-srt. Define min-mm (respectively exact-mm) to be the problem of deciding, given a graph G and integer K, whether G admits a maximal matching of size at most (respectively exactly) K. Our reductions utilise the NP-completeness of exact-mm in cubic graphs, which we now establish. Lemma 1. exact-mm is NP-complete, even for cubic graphs.
Proof. Clearly exact-mm belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from min-mm, which is NP-complete even for cubic graphs [6] . Let G (a cubic graph) and K (a positive integer) be an instance of the latter problem. Without loss of generality we may assume that K ≤ β(G), where β(G) denotes the size of a maximum matching of G. Suppose that G admits a maximal matching M , where |M | = k ≤ K. If k = K, we are done. Otherwise suppose that k < K. We note that maximal matchings satisfy the interpolation property [5] (i.e. G has a maximal matching of size j, for k ≤ j ≤ β(G)) and hence G has a maximal matching of size K. The converse is clear.
We now define some notation. Let I be an instance of sr and let A be the set of agents in I. Given a i ∈ A, we define a set of agents P (a i ) to be a prefix of a i 's preference list in I if P (a i ) ⊆ A i and whenever a j ∈ P (a i ) and a i prefers a k to a j , it follows that a k ∈ P (a i ). The following lemma will also be required by our reduction that establishes the inapproximability of min-bp-sr.
Lemma 2. Let I be an instance of sr with underlying graph G = (A, E). Let a i ∈ A and let P (a i ) be a prefix of a i 's preference list in I. Then, for every k ≥ 1, there exists an instance I of sr with underlying graph G = (A , E ), where A ⊆ A , |A | = |A| + 2k and E ⊆ E , satisfying the following two properties:
(If I is an instance of src then I is also an instance of src.)
Proof. Let k ≥ 1 be given. We create a set B k of new agents, where B k = {b 2 , . . . , b 2k+1 }. Let A = A∪B k . Then |A | = |A|+2k as required. The preference list of a i in I is as follows:
where, for S ⊆ A i , [[S]] denotes those members of S listed in the order induced from a i 's preference list in I. For exposition purposes, we also denote a i by b 1 .
For 2 ≤ r ≤ 2k + 1, the preference list of b r in I is as follows: Finally, every agent in A\{a i } forms a preference list in I by appending the members of B k to their preference list in I (in arbitrary strict order). The definition of E follows by construction of the preference lists in I ; hence E ⊆ E . Given a matching M in I and an agent b r ∈ B k who is matched in M , define pr(b r , M ) to be the set of agents whom b r prefers to M (b r ).
To show (1) above, let M be a matching in I such that a i is matched in M and
, where b r , b s ∈ B k and r < s. We firstly suppose that
To show (2) above, let M be a matching in I , and suppose that a i is matched in M and M (a i ) / ∈ P (a i ), or a i is unmatched in M . Then there is an agent b j ∈ B k who is not matched to a proper agent in M . Define E to be the edges in the subgraph of G induced by
Henceforth we adopt the following notation, given an instance I of sr. Given an agent a i , a prefix P (a i ) of a i 's preference list and an integer k ≥ 1, the symbol G k (a i ) in a i 's preference list following the members of P (a i ) denotes the introduction of the new agents in B k together with their preference lists, and the insertion of the members of B k in subscript order at the relevant point in a i 's preference list, as described by the proof of Lemma 2. Given two agents a i , a j and integers k, l ≥ 1, usage of the symbols G k (a i ) and G l (a j ) in the preference lists of a i and a j respectively implies that the agents in B k as introduced for a i are disjoint from the agents in B l as introduced for a j .
We now present a gap-introducing reduction, starting from exact-mm, that establishes the hardness of approximating min-bp-sr. Theorem 1. min-bp-sr is not approximable within n Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. Let G = (V, E) (a cubic graph) and K (a positive integer) be an instance of exact-mm. Assume that V = {v 1 , . . . , v p } and q = |E|. We assume that 2K ≤ p, for otherwise exact-mm trivially has a "no" answer.
We create an instance I of src in which the set A of agents includes U ∪ Z ∪ H ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ W and also additional agents that arise from instances of gadgets that are constructed implicitly by the proof of Lemma 2. The preference lists of
Preference lists in the constructed sr instance I. Figure 2 . In a given agent a's preference list, the symbol [S], for S ⊆ U ∪ Z ∪ H ∪ X, denotes all members of S listed in increasing subscript order. Similarly, for S ⊆ W , the symbol [S] denotes all members of S listed in arbitrary strict order. Also, the symbol . . . denotes all remaining agents (other than a) listed in arbitrary strict order. For certain agents in I, we now define a prefix P (a) of a's preference list as follows. For each agent a ∈ U ∪ Z ∪ H ∪ W , define P (a) to be the set of agents whom a prefers to every member of X. For each agent y r ∈ Y , define P (y r ) = {x r }. It may be verified that the number of agents in I is n = 7p + p − 2K + 2C + 2CD +4qC = 2p 2t +6p t+1 +2p t +8p−2K (since G is cubic), which is polynomial in the size of the given instance of exact-mm.
Suppose that M is a maximal matching in G, where |M | = K. We create a matching M in I as follows. Let {v i , v j } ∈ E where i < j. Suppose firstly that {v i , v j } ∈ M . Let s 1 = σ i,j and let s 2 = σ j,i . Add the pairs {u , . . . , u 1 t p−2K denote these agents, where t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t p−2K . Add {u
Finally, since M (y r ) ∈ P (y r ) for each agent y r ∈ Y , we may extend M by adding the edges that follow from Property 1 of Lemma 2 as applied to G D (y r ). Conversely suppose that G does not admit a maximal matching of size K. Suppose for a contradiction that bp(I) < C. Let M be a matching in I such that |bp(M )| = bp(I) < C. Clearly every agent must be matched in M , as I is an instance of src and n is even. Also by Property 2 of Lemma 2, it follows that {y r , x r } ∈ M for all y r ∈ Y , for otherwise |bp(M )| ≥ C, a contradiction. Hence for each a ∈ U ∪ Z ∪ H ∪ W , it follows that M (a) ∈ P (a), for otherwise {x r , a} ∈ bp(M ) for all x r ∈ X, so that |bp(M )| ≥ C, a contradiction.
Also for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), {u 
Then there exists some edge {v i , v j } ∈ E such that each of v i and v j is unmatched in M . Hence {u Next we show that p t−1 > n 1 2 −ε . Firstly recall that
As G is cubic, we may assume that p ≥ 4. Hence Equation 1 implies that n < 16p 2t , and thus p t−1 > 16
But Equation 1 also implies that n ≥ p 2t , since 2K ≤ p. As p ≥ 4, it follows that n ≥ 4 2t ≥ 4
2(t−1) εt
, and hence 4 Proof. We use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 1 (for any ε < 1) and set K = p. Clearly G admits a maximal matching of size K if and only if I admits a matching with exactly K blocking pairs.
We now consider the case where preference lists may include ties. For a given instance I of srt, we define opt(I) = 1 + bp(I) as discussed in Section 1. The following result establishes the hardness of approximating min-bp-srt.
Theorem 2. min-bp-srt is not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. The result holds even if all preference lists are complete, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. This result follows by adapting the proof of Theorem 1; we outline only the modifications here. For the revised reduction, choose t = 
As in the proof of Theorem 1, if G admits a maximal matching of size K, we may construct a matching M in I. However M is modified as follows: if {a, b} ∈ M for a, b ∈ U ∪Z∪H ∪W , we replace {a, b} by {a(s), b(s)} (1 ≤ s ≤ F ). The presence of the ties now implies that M is stable in I, so that opt(I) = 1.
Conversely if G does not admit a maximal matching of size K, then as in the proof of Theorem 1, we let M be any matching in I such that |bp(M )| = bp(I). If {x r , y r } / ∈ M for some r (1 ≤ r ≤ C), it follows that |bp(M )| ≥ D. Otherwise, it may be verified that each class of agents C(s) (1 ≤ s ≤ F ) contributes at least C blocking pairs of M , for if not then G admits a maximal matching of size K. Further, these F sets of blocking pairs are pairwise disjoint, so that |bp(M )| ≥ F C = D. Hence opt(I) ≥ D + 1 = p t + 1. Next we show that p t ≥ n 1−ε . For, we firstly note that n = (8p − 2K + 4qC)F + 2C + 2CD, so that
Without loss of generality we may assume that p ≥ 9. Hence Equation 3 implies that n ≤ 9p t+1 , and thus p t ≥ 9
Equation 3 also implies that n ≥ 9 t , since 2K ≤ p. It follows that n ≥ 9 2t ε(t+1) , and hence 9
We denote by exact-bp-srt the extension of exact-bp-sr to the srt case. Corollary 1 may be strengthened for exact-bp-srt as follows. It is known that the problem of deciding whether an srtc instance I admits a stable matching is NP-complete [13, 8] . Form an srtc instance J by adding to I a new agent a i such that A i = A\{a i } and P (a i ) = ∅, together with the new agents that are created by Lemma 2 as applied to a i , with k = K. Clearly I admits a stable matching if and only if J admits a matching with exactly K blocking pairs. We have therefore proved: Theorem 3. exact-bp-srt is NP-complete for each fixed K ≥ 0.
3 Polynomial-time algorithm for fixed K In this section we consider the case that I is an sr instance with underlying graph G = (A, E) and K ≥ 1 is a fixed constant. We give an O(m K+1 ) algorithm that finds a matching M in I such that |bp I (M )| = K, or reports that no such matching exists. Later, we show how to modify this algorithm if we require that
Our algorithm is based on generating subsets B of edges of G, where |B| = K -these edges will form the blocking pairs with respect to a matching to be constructed in a subgraph of G. Given such a set B, we form a subgraph G B = (A, E B ) of G as follows. For each agent a i incident to an edge e = {a i , a j } ∈ B, if e is a blocking pair of a matching M , it follows that {a i , a j } / ∈ M and a i cannot be matched in M to an agent whom he prefers to a j in I. Hence we delete {a i , a j } from E B , and also we delete {a i , a k } from E B for any a k such that a i prefers a k to a j in I. If any such edge {a i , a k } is not in B, then we require that {a i , a k } is not a blocking pair of a constructed matching M . This can only be achieved if a k is matched in M to an agent whom he prefers to a i in I. Hence we invoke truncate a k (a i ), which represents the operation of deleting {a k , a l } from E B , for any a l such that a k prefers a i to a l in I. Additionally we add a k to a set P to subsequently check that a k is matched in M .
Having completed the construction of G B , we denote by I B the sr instance with underlying graph G B and preference lists obtained by restricting the preferences in I to E B . By construction of G B , it is immediate that any matching M in G B satisfies B ⊆ bp I (M ). To avoid any additional blocking pairs in I, we seek a stable matching in I B in which all agents in P are matched. We apply Irving's algorithm for sr [4] to I B -suppose it finds a stable matching M in I B . If all agents in P are matched then, as we will show, bp I (M ) = B, and hence |bp I (M )| = K -thus we may output M and halt. If some agents in P are unmatched in M then we need not consider any other stable matching in I B , since Theorem 4.5.2 of [4] asserts that the same agents are matched in all stable matchings in I B . Hence (and also in the case that no stable matching in I B is found), we may consider the next subset B. If we complete the generation of all subsets B without having output a matching M , we report that no matching with the desired property exists. The algorithm is displayed as Algorithm K-BP in Figure 3 . The following theorem establishes its correctness and complexity.
for each B ⊆ E such that |B| = K EB := E; // GB = (A, EB) is a subgraph of G P := ∅; for each agent ai incident to some {ai, aj} ∈ B delete {ai, aj} from EB; for each agent a k such that ai prefers a k to aj in I delete {ai, a k } from EB; if {ai, a k } / ∈ B truncatea k (ai); P := P ∪ {a k }; if there is a stable matching M in IB if every agent in P is matched in M output M and halt; report that no matching with K blocking pairs exists; Proof. Suppose firstly that the algorithm outputs a matching M when the outermost loop considered a set B. We show that M is a matching in I such that bp I (M ) = B. As previously mentioned, B ⊆ bp I (M ). We now show that
Hence {a k , a l } has been deleted by the algorithm. Thus without loss of generality a k ∈ P , so that a k is matched in M and a k prefers M (a k ) to a l in I. Hence {a k , a l } / ∈ bp I (M ) after all, so that bp I (M ) = B. Now suppose that M is a matching in I such that bp I (M ) = B, where |B| = K. By the above paragraph, if, before considering B, the outermost loop had already output a matching M when considering a subset B , then bp I (M ) = B , and |B | = K. Otherwise, when the outermost loop considers the subset B, it must be the case that no edge of M is deleted when constructing G B . Hence M ⊆ E B . Moreover M is stable in I B , for if not then e ∈ bp I B (M ) for some e ∈ E B , and hence e ∈ bp I (M ). As B ∩ E B = ∅, it follows that e ∈ bp I (M )\B, a contradiction. Finally every member of P is matched in M , for suppose a k ∈ P is unmatched in M . As a k ∈ P , there is some agent a i such that a i prefers a k to a j in I, where {a i , a j } ∈ B and {a i , a k } / ∈ B. Hence {a i , a k } ∈ bp I (M )\B, Note that it is straightforward to modify Algorithm K-BP so that it outputs the largest stable matching taken over all subsets B -we may then find a matching M such that (i) |bp I (M )| = K, and (ii) M is of maximum cardinality with respect to (i). This extension uses the fact that all stable matchings in I B have the same size [4, Theorem 4.5.2], so that the choice of stable matching constructed by the algorithm is not of significance for Condition (ii).
Finally we remark that Algorithm K-BP may easily be modified in order to find a matching M such that bp I (M ) ≤ K: the outermost loop iterates over all subsets B of E such that |B| ≤ K. Again, one can find a maximum such matching if required. The time complexity of the algorithm remains unchanged.
Upper and lower bounds for bp(I)
In this section we present upper and lower bounds for bp(I), given an sr instance I, in terms of properties of a stable partition as defined in Section 1. The following results concerning stable partitions were established by Tan [16] .
Theorem 5 ([16]).
Given an sr instance I, 1. I admits a stable partition Π, which may be found in O(n 2 ) time; 2. if C i is an odd-length cycle in Π of length ≥ 1 (henceforth an odd cycle) in Π then C i is an odd cycle in any stable partition of Π; 3. I admits a stable matching if and only if Π has no odd cycle of length ≥ 3.
Let C denote the set of odd cycles of length ≥ 3 in a stable partition Π. Given
, where d G (a j ) denotes the degree of vertex a j in the underlying graph G of I. We firstly give an upper bound for bp(I).
Lemma 3. Given an sr instance I, the bound bp(I) ≤ Ci∈C (d i − 1) holds.
Proof. We firstly remark that the upper bound is invariant for I by Part 2 of Theorem 5. It follows by [17, Proposition 4.1] and [16, Proposition 3.2] that, by deleting a vertex of minimum degree from each odd cycle of C, and then by decomposing each even length cycle into pairs, we obtain a matching M that is stable in the instance J of sr so obtained. It then follows by Properties (i) and (ii) of Π as given in Section 1 that every blocking pair of M in I involves a deleted vertex, and moreover for any deleted vertex
In order to derive our lower bound for bp(I), it will be helpful to utilise a construction due to Cechlárová and Fleiner [1] which involves transforming a given sr instance I into an sr instance I e as follows. In I e , the preference lists of Fig. 4 . Preference lists of the newly-introduced agents in Ie.
the agents in A are initially the same as the corresponding preference lists in I. We then replace each edge e k = {a i , a j } (where i < j) in the underlying graph of I by a 6-cycle involving vertices a Cechlárová and Fleiner [1] showed that a stable matching M in I corresponds to a stable matching M e in I e , and vice versa, as follows: Proof. It follows from the proof of Theorem 4 that bp(I) = k if and only if k is the minimum number for which there exists a set S of k edges such that the sr instance I obtained by deleting the edges in S from I admits a stable matching. To delete an edge e k = {a i , a j } from I is equivalent to deleting the two vertices a 1 k and a 6 k from I e . That is, after deleting the above set S of edges, instance I has a stable matching if and only if, after deleting the corresponding k pairs of vertices from I e , the obtained instance I e has a stable matching. But by [17, Theorem 4.2] , the number of odd cycles can decrease by at most one after deleting one vertex, so after deleting k edges from I, the number of odd cycles can decrease by at most 2k in I e . Hence if |C| > 2k, then I e still has at least one odd cycle of length ≥ 3, so neither I e nor I can admit a stable matching.
Concluding remarks
The strong inapproximability results presented in this paper are perhaps surprising, in view of Theorem 5 and the various structural properties of a stable partition [16, 17] . We conclude with two open problems.
Firstly, given an sr instance I and a matching M in I, it follows that bp(M ) ≤ m = O(n 2 ). Is there an approximation algorithm for min-bp-sr with performance guarantee o(m)?
Secondly, it remains open to determine whether the bounds for bp(I) presented in Section 4 are tight, and in particular to establish values of k n and to obtain a characterisation of I n such that I n is an sr instance with n agents, in which bp(I n ) = k n and bp(I n ) is maximum over all sr instances with n agents.
